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Abstract: 
The 1994 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) established goals 
for the expansion of population assistance. So far the financial promises made by donor 
countries in 1994 have not been lived up to. To unravel the gap between ambitions and actual 
contributions we use panel estimation methods to see what lies behind the level of donor 
contributions and the sharing of burdens across the various categories of population and 
HIV/AIDS assistance in 21 donor countries (for the years 1996-2002). Contributions of 
donors depend heavily on the economic wealth and (religious) preferences of donor countries. 
The sharing of the ICPD burden within the group of OECD/DAC countries is in line with the 
ability to pay of donor countries although below the surface of the aggregate we notice a 
specialization in channels for aid: small countries predominantly use multilateral aid agencies 
whereas large countries rely more on bilateral aid channels. Catholic countries are averse to 
donating unearmarked funds (flowing primarily to multilateral agencies) or earmarked funds 
targeted at family planning programs. 
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Introduction 
What determines the level and allocation of donor government funding in population 
assistance programs? And why do disbursements generally lag behind the good intentions? 
These questions are the focus of attention of policy makers and advisors within government, 
NGOs and multilateral agencies in both developing and developed world. The intentions of 
179 international governments who were involved in the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) in the summer 1994 were quite clear and leave almost 
no room for what should determine funding efforts.  “All countries should take steps to meet 
the family planning needs of their populations as soon as possible and should, in all cases by 
the year 2015, seek to provide universal access to a full range of safe and reliable family 
planning methods and to related reproductive health services which are not against the law.” 
(par. 7.16) The donor governments promised to finance one third of the total amount of 
resource flows that are tied to population activities in developing countries. At that moment in 
time the Programme of Action was lauded with praise and entitled as “a turning point in 
humanity” and “a quantum leap to a higher state of energy.” Today we are halfway through 
the 20-year Programme of Action and commentators, policy makers and advocates are 
worried by the fact that actual disbursements of funds are lagging behind promises and the 
unbalanced attention for specific population issues within the ICPD agenda. Specifically the 
dominance of the HIV/AIDS programs and the neglect of family planning and reproductive 
health care in spelling out Millennium Development Goals (MDG) has worried many within 
the family planning movement (cf. Cleland and Sinding, 2005). As Sinding stated: “If you’re 
not an MDG, you’re not on the agenda. If you’re not a line item, you’re out of the game.” 
(cited in Crossette, 2005: 77) The divergence between promises and actions has been around 
ever since the Programme of Action was formalized and translated into financial statements. 
According to ICPD projections at that time, reproductive health costs in developing countries   3
would likely total 17 billion US dollars in the year 2000 and 21.7 billion US dollars in 2015 
(at 1993 prices).
1 The unmet need in matters of family planning of developing countries and 
the AIDS pandemic should be the driving force behind donor behavior, but in the actual 
practice of foreign aid other factors – less altruistically inspired motives - impinge on 
population aid decisions. It should not come as a surprise that up to the year 2002 the 
promises made at Cairo have not been lived up to. However, the gap between promises and 
action seems to be closing gradually and this forces one to think about the question: what 
explains the gap between stated ambitions and actual contributions and what has happened 
since the Cairo conference? If the increases in donor contributions are just temporary or if the 
allocation across spending categories is radically different from the allocation agreed then 
there are reasons to be worried. 
The main contribution of this paper is to offer an empirical examination of the driving 
forces and preferences behind the funds provided and the allocation of funds by donors, as 
envisioned in the ICPD Programme of Action. In that respect it complements the discussion 
by Blanc and Tsui (2005) and Crossette (2005) who offered a view how insiders appraise the 
faltering status of family planning movement and the dominance of the HIV/AIDS camp. 
According to insiders the changing positions has in part been helped by the way the 
Millenium Development Goals were formalized. Within this light it is of considerable 
importance to see whether the numbers tell a different story. The central question – what 
drives donor funding? - is evaluated by two dimensions: (1) the level of donor contributions 
and its allocation over the various reproductive health categories; and (2) the  
sharing of burdens within population and AIDS programs. Before we do so, we will first 
explain in brief why funding by donors fluctuates or why in principle promises in global 
collective action are rarely attained (cf. Bulir and Hamann, 2003). 
   4
Understanding donor behavior 
Understanding donor behavior starts with the fact that foreign aid is just like any other line 
item in the government budget prone to the influences of politics and the economy. Donating 
money is a public choice and by their very human nature donors, to cite Mayhew (2002: 220), 
“are not neutral, philanthropic givers of gifts. Donors are subject to the national and 
international political interests that can influence their decisions on program and service 
support to the detriment of local needs.” In general one can think of four reasons why the 
level of foreign population assistance is lagging behind the grand ambitions of Cairo: (1) a 
lack in willingness to pay; (2) a lack in ability to pay; (3) the appearance of ‘free rider’ 
behavior in financing global public goods; and (4) political opportunism. 
The first argument is straightforward: the provision of funds is simply a matter of 
‘taste’: a taste for caring about others, or a preference for certain programs which are in line 
with one’s religious beliefs or Weltanschauung. In this respect, one can expect some donor 
countries to be more sensitive towards the fate of people living in the less developed world 
than other donors as some (population) programs are more in line with their preferences. 
Furthermore, governments of European countries are known to be more egalitarian in their 
national economic policies and these egalitarian preferences may perhaps carry over towards 
income differences in the world at large. But differences in taste may also be reflected in 
(religious) belief systems. For instance, the so-called Mexico City Policy (by its opponents 
called ‘the Global Gag Rule’) as re-imposed by President Bush in 2001 is a case in point. This 
rule restricts foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive USAID family 
planning funds from using their own, non-USAID funds to provide abortion-related activities. 
This rule was first introduced by President Reagan in 1984, but since 1993 rescinded by 
President Clinton. It does, of course, come as a surprise that ideology matters in making 
choices, what makes the US foreign aid policy different from other textbook public choices is   5
that this policy rule can have substantial spillovers in the decisions and actions of other donor 
countries and recipients of aid. 
The second argument – the ability to pay – will often be provided by donor 
governments themselves when funds are not forthcoming and the press or a consortium 
complain about members not living up to their promises. Foreign aid is part of the 
government budget deliberations of national governments and when a government encounters 
a business cycle downturn or unexpected increases in government spending, ambitions have 
to be toned down and priorities have to be changed. One can expect foreign aid to be part of 
those changing budget priorities. For instance, constraints on deficit financing may prevent 
governments from donating money. For instance, most of the European Union members have 
to live up to fiscal rules of the European and Monetary Union – the Stability and Growth Pact 
- and hence national economic developments are bound to affect foreign aid policies of those 
countries. 
The third argument – the presence of free rider behavior (Sandler, 2004) - is the most 
difficult behavioral element to assess, but this type of behavior may very well be an element 
that hampers the generation of donor funds in the context of the Cairo conference. When 
collective action is necessary to achieve an outcome (e.g., reduce poverty) which benefits all 
countries in the world with an interest in the recipient’s well-being, it is in the interest of the 
individual country to contribute to the provision of the collective good like a global aid 
program or institution. It is enlightened self interest to participate in and pay for collective 
action. The seminal contribution of Mancur Olson in his The Logic of Collective Action 
(1965) was to show that rational individuals may make choices leaving the collective in an 
inferior position. Individual rationality is not sufficient to provide a collective rational choice 
and this statement was in marked contrast with the received view that markets do not fail and 
individual decisions always promote the common good. Free riders destroy this ideal world.   6
To be more specific, free riders are those individuals who benefit from collective action but 
who do not contribute or who do not contribute sufficiently and for the collective this may 
imply that goods are not provided or in insufficient amounts. Population assistance programs 
pose a collective action problem for the international community not unlike many other 
foreign aid programs. Many developing nations must rely on other nations to provide them 
with resources and cash to finance population activities, like family planning, investments in 
reproductive health, AIDS programs and basic research. By increasing the welfare of a 
recipient country, foreign aid serves as a collective global good for all donor countries. For 
instance, if the US helps India and the UK is also interested in the well being of India the UK 
government can free ride on the foreign aid efforts of the US government. This mechanism is 
akin to a host of collective action failures in foreign aid and may well explain why promises 
are rarely met. Detecting free rider behavior is, however, far more difficult than stating the 
problem of free riders. 
The economists Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) were the first to empirically examine 
free rider behavior within international alliances. They focused in their pioneering study 
mainly on the financing of military strategic alliances, such as the NATO. Their theory can 
however be applied to other issues which share the problem of alliances in financing a public 
good, and foreign aid is one of them. Essentially their ‘exploitation thesis’ boils down to the 
following point: the welfare of the recipient depends on the sum of aid received from others 
and the recipient does not really care where the money is coming from. Suppose, furthermore, 
that the recipient’s welfare affects the welfare of the would-be donors in a positive manner, 
then donor contributions will be positively related to the donor’s income. Wealthier nations 
would have a greater desire to contribute aid and so wealthier nations will also bear a larger 
share of the burden than less well-off nations. In other words, small countries will exploit the 
benevolence of large countries. The provision of foreign aid would then be less than optimal   7
and some supranational action should be initiated to correct this failure. This type of behavior 
may very well be an element that distorts the generation of donor funds in the context of the 
Cairo conference. The question is therefore whether some governments of small countries are 
‘free riding’ on the contributions of large countries like the US and Japan? Or is it simply the 
other way around? 
Besides the dynamics of collective action, there may also be traces of political 
opportunism – the fourth factor - in explaining donor behavior. Governments pledged to live 
up to the Cairo agenda but living up to this ideal involves resources, which could also be 
spent on internal more visible issues offering more value for money in the eyes of the voter.  
This type of behavior is aptly described by public choice models in which politicians serve the 
needs of the voter or who try to signal to voters by their policy actions that they are worth 
voting for. If this applies to the case of foreign aid then it is the interests of the voters in the 
donor countries that are served and not the interests of those living in less developed 
countries. The business of foreign aid may perhaps be paved with good intentions, in practice 
one cannot deny the role which colonial ties, favorable trade positions, governance structures, 
religious beliefs, geography and human rights can play in bringing about and sustaining aid 
flows (Schraeder, Taylor and Hook, 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2001; Chauvet, 2002; 
Neumayer, 2003). It would be very surprising to see that population assistance would not be 
susceptible to such self-interested motives. In short, the question we are trying to answer is 
whether donor behavior is a matter of opportunism?  
The inherent difficulty with the above stated elements that affect donor funding is that 
each and every element is difficult to disentangle from aggregate spending figures. We are 
well aware of the pitfalls of using aggregate data. At best, the patterns revealed in the donor 
funding data suggest that some mechanism or rule of thumb is at work that prevents the 
international community from attaining goals set at population conferences, or the patterns   8
might destroy myths or anecdotes which persist in sketching a picture of the international 
community of donor governments. 
 
Donor Funding Statistics 
In order to explore the question what determines size and allocation of donor funding as well 
as the sharing of financial burdens we will make use of data which UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI 
collected and reported in UNFPA’s Financial Resource Flows for Population Activities 
Report.
2 We want to examine how the various earmarked and unearmarked funds provided by 
21 donor countries develop over time.
3 The unearmarked funds are funds provided by 
governments which have no specific spending category as these funds are transferred to 
multilateral organizations and international NGOs who in turn will allocate them to the 
categories of the so-called ‘costed package’ of the ICPD agenda. The earmarked funds are 
targeted to specific projects in the four population assistance categories: family planning, 
reproductive health care, HIV/AIDS activities and basic research.
4 These four categories have 
been collected in a consistent way by NIDI from 1996 onwards and hence our total sample 
period runs from 1996 to 2002.
5 Examining the flow of funds over a longer stretch in time, 
including the years before 1996 is a more complicated exercise because of the expanded 
mandate of the Cairo Conference where reproductive health care was explicitly introduced 
(see Bulatao, 1998). 
 
Level of Disbursements 
To start with the level of funding, this is, of course, the magnitude which is at the focus of 
attention of the participating countries of the Cairo conference. Ambitions were stated in 1994 
for the total group of OECD/DAC countries in US dollars (in 1993 prices) and in percentages. 
In dollars the goal for the year 2000 was set at US$ 5.7 billion to increase over the years to the   9
level of US$ 7.2 billion in 2015 when the Cairo program officially ends. In percentages the 
primary funds should be at least 4 percent of the level of official development assistance 
(ODA). As one can see from Table 1 the time series patterns in the various categories and 
totals is quite erratic. To start with the aggregate level: there seems to have been a clear 
improvement as the level of primary funds has increased from $1.4 billion to $2.1 billion (in 
current prices). And if these levels are expressed as a percentage of the aggregate level of 
ODA the improvement can be deemed substantial, since population assistance increased with 
a full percentage point: from 2.5 to 3.5 percent of ODA. However, most donor countries are 
lagging behind their promises if one looks at the promises once made. Figure 1 gives an 
impression of the gap that exists between promises and actions of donor countries as a 
collective entity. The ambitions are derived from the stated goals in the development 
programs to allocate 4 percent of ODA to population assistance and the level of official 
development assistance itself should ideally constitute 0.7 percent of GDP. Based on those 
premises the donor countries should give approximately $7 billion (see Figure 1) annually 
over the period 1996-2002. 
 
HERE FIGURE 1 
 
But the actual disbursements of funds have varied in the past between $1.4 and $2.1 billion 
(see Table 1) and has been quite volatile in these seven years. The same can be said for the 
underlying categories. The unearmarked contributions follow a U-shaped pattern over time, 
family planning seems to follow an inverse U-pattern, HIV/AIDS spending increases with 
some jumps, and reproductive health and basic research are hard to describe in a simple time 
pattern. 
   10
HERE TABLE 1 
 
Sharing the ICPD Burden 
In Table 2 we present the average shares of the OECD/DAC countries in the total of funds per 
donor category. Each category of population assistance is characterized by a marked different 
distribution across donors. The unearmarked funds are, however, not allocated directly, as 
mentioned earlier. To get an impression of the ability to donate funds the share in GDP per 
country in the total GDP of the group of 21 countries is also added to the table in column (7). 
 
HERE TABLE 2 
 
One can see clearly how the allocation differs quite distinctly across the different categories. 
The United States is the dominant player in questions of family planning in which it carries 
almost 80 percent of the total burden. To a lesser extent, but nevertheless a clear dominant 
position, can be traced in questions of HIV/AIDS activities and basic research where almost 
60 percent of the funds comes from the United States. In case of unearmarked contributions 
and contributions to the reproductive health care category the smaller countries such as 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands are relatively ‘big’ players. Of course, some 
of these country differences are confounded when the total of primary funds are evaluated vis-
a-vis the carrying capacity of countries. Clear ‘outperformers’ in donor funding are 
respectively Norway (5.4 times its GDP share), the Netherlands (factor 5.2), Denmark (factor 
5.0) and Sweden (factor 3.7). And, of course, there also countries that underperform 
compared to their level of GDP such as Austria (11 percent of its GDP share), Italy (16 
percent), Spain (19 percent), France (21 percent), Japan (39 percent). These type of rankings 
compare well to evaluations made by Cairo-watchers such as International Planned   11
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and Population Action International (PAI). A striking fact in 
this ranking of outperformers and underperformers is that the same ranking does not 
correspond closely with that of ODA. 
 
HERE FIGURE 2 
 
In Figure 2 the primary funds share (of Table 1) is compared with the ODA share of these 21 
countries. Countries such as Japan, France, Germany, Spain and Italy apparently have a 
different preference for the allocation of ODA as their ODA share is far larger than their 
population aid share, and the United States has a far lower share when it comes to ODA. This 
suggests that countries have either different interests or differ with respect to their 
comparative advantages in providing population aid. Figure 3 offers a more detailed picture 
for all OECD/DAC countries of their allocation of development assistance funds. 
 
HERE FIGURE 3 
 
To examine a number of examples of countries where domestic interests prevail over the 
interest of the developing world we can start with Japan. In the case of Japan it becomes clear 
by reading the ODA Charter where the ultimate objective of Japanese development assistance 
is stated as: “to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and 
thereby help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.” Foreign aid can be viewed as 
enlightened self interest and this becomes apparent by the large share of loans (55 percent) of 
the bilateral aid of Japan – aid is tacitly seen as an investment in less developed countries and 
not a gift - and a clear priority attribution of ODA to Asia: 74 percent of ODA is disbursed to 
the region with China, Indonesia, India and the Philippines as the largest recipients.   12
Similar interests can be traced in the French view on ODA, which is managed by a 
diverse number of actors, each with its specific goals. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
combines the goal of solidarity with influence in support of French diplomacy. Its Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry aims at promoting export, investment and economic 
relations with developing countries. Considering the preoccupation of French development 
policy with such goals, it does not come as a surprise that population aid does not appeal to 
the French government as population assistance does not generate benefits which might help 
politicians win an election or generate (visible) benefits in general. The geographical bias in 
assistance is present in the case of French government, but it is also prevalent in the minds of 
most Europeans. Europeans by and large think that geographic proximity should be an 
element in helping the poor. Japan is best placed to help Asia, the United States should help 
Latin America and Europeans are of the opinion that Europe is best placed to help Africa. 
Only the people in new EU member states have their doubts and think that the United States is 
best placed to help Africa (Eurobarometer, 2005). The French respondents are very outspoken 
with respect to helping the poor in Africa, but then again this is a continent with some firm 
roots in the French republic. 
The motive of enlightened self interest which drives funding in France and Japan is in 
stark contrast with the reviews which the Norwegian and Dutch government received in the 
past. Both are leading countries in terms of donor contributions to the ICPD Programme of 
Action and development assistance in general. Official development assistance totaled 0.9 and 
0.8 percent, respectively, of their gross national product. These governments are firmly 
devoted to fighting poverty in LDCs. It is known from numerous policy documents that the 
Norwegian government emphasizes a rights-based approach to development in connection 
with the fight against poverty. In other words, it will assist partner countries to incorporate 
obligations to deliver human rights within their national poverty reduction strategies. The   13
Millenium Development Goals are at the central reference point for Norwegian aid policy. 
The same can be said of the Dutch government, where poverty reduction is the overarching 
rationale for its development assistance. What strikes us is that in the Eurobarometer-survey 
(2005) almost 80 percent of the Dutch citizens believe that development aid provided by their 
government makes a difference for people living in developing countries. This is in marked 
contrast with, e.g. the aid provided by French and Italian governments: approximately 50 
percent of the citizens of these countries believe nationally provided development aid makes a 
difference. The Dutch also favor the use of country-owned strategies and it tries to make 
extensive use of private and non-governmental organizations in implementing its programs. 
This policy stance is in line with the goals and intentions stated in the ICPD agenda. E.g., 
family planning and reproductive health care are typically about empowering women and 
giving households the opportunity to make well-balanced family choices. 
Finally, we cannot neglect the influence of the United States in supporting population 
assistance and the ICPD agenda. The role of the United States has always been large in 
matters of population assistance (see Salas, 1979; Wolfson, 1983; Schindlmayer, 2004) and 
recently the clear shift towards fighting HIV/AIDS has become a dominant theme in the 
allocation of primary funds by the United States (see Van Dalen and Reuser, 2005) thanks to 
such initiatives as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The initiative 
may be well chosen as alarming reports such as those by Jha et al. (2002) make clear that that 
the annual costs of fighting HIV/AIDS will rise from $15 billion in 2007 to $25 billion in 
2015. However, the role of the United States cannot be well understood if attention is focused 
on aggregate US figures. The leading role in matters of population assistance have given the 
US government power to affect behavior of other donors and international non-governmental 
organizations. The Mexico City Policy, instituted by the US president Bush, is a telling 
example of how political ideology can affect donor funding behavior. As mentioned earlier,   14
this policy restricts foreign NGOs that receive USAID family planning funds from using their 
own, non-USAID funds to provide abortion related activities. What complicates the case of 
the ICPD agenda is that this policy rule could affect foreign NGO funding in a direct manner, 
it prevents freedom of speech
6 and in the long-run it could undermine international 
cooperation as the United States as a dominant player can set the rules which may not always 
coincide with preferences of other donors.
7 
Of course, each country tells a different story, and what these examples illustrate is 
that diverse interests, ideologies, income development and historical backgrounds play a role 
in generating population assistance. The main aim of this paper is to shed light on which 
factors come into play in supporting the Programme of Action of the ICPD agenda. 
 
Method and Results 
To explain the behavior of donors in funding over time more thoroughly we have pooled the 
experiences of the 21 countries and employed the method of dynamic panel estimation.
8 
Despite a small time interval (1996-2002) we still have substantial variation across the various 
countries to distill a clear pattern of funding. Needless to say, this model will be more useful 
in describing the patterns across countries than within countries across time because of the 
short sample period. We will focus on examining the driving forces behind the level of 




Among the most important potential explanatory factors are income and income distribution 
of a country, the pro-foreign assistance stance of some countries as measured by the share of 
official development assistance as a percentage of GDP, the gap in development (as   15
approximated by the difference in the human development index in the donor countries and in 
the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the business cycle state of an economy as measured by 
the level of unemployment, and the influence of particular religions in a country. The 
explanatory variables come from different sources. The level of GDP (total and per capita), 
Official Development Assistance (excluding population assistance, expressed as a percentage 
of GDP), government size (as measured by general government final consumption 
expenditure as percentage of GDP), unemployment rate (as percentage of labor force) are all 
extracted from the World Bank Development Indicators (edition 2004). The ODA variable is 
corrected for the influence of population aid by subtracting the level of primary funds from 
the level of ODA. The Human Development Index is a weighted average of income, literacy 
and life expectancy, with weights as described in Human Development Reports of the UN, 
but with data from the World Development Indicators. The income inequality measures (i.c. 
Gini indices) come from the Luxembourg Income Study which reports at irregular intervals 
the state of income inequality in a host of OECD countries. All the previously stated variables 
are defined in logarithmic form so the relevant coefficients can be more easily interpreted as 
elasticities. The religion dummies apply to the presence of (Roman) Catholic, Lutheran or 
Protestant religion belonging to the two most dominant religions in each country as registered 
by UNESCO (2000).
9 Finally, we have included membership of the European Union as an 
explanatory dummy because we expect that some countries will take account of the fact that 
the European Union is a separate contributor to the ICPD agenda and changes in donor 
funding from the EU can have some effect on funding behavior of individual EU members. 
Opportunism comes in different guises and we aim to look at one source of 
opportunism. According to an overview of population assistance from the 1970s to the 1990s 
by Schindlmayer (2001, 2004), population conferences are places where money is easily 
raised to cash in on the attention of those gatherings. To test the idea of opportunism in   16
funding, we will use the case of the population conference held in The Hague in February 
1999 as our testing ground. An opportunist government would raise its level of funding in the 
year 1999 when the focus of the developed world is on the developing world and decrease its 
funding afterwards. For this purpose we defined a dummy variable that takes on the value 
zero before 1999, has the value 1 in the year 1999 and for the remaining three years in our 
sample period the dummy value is –1. The assumption is therefore that during the year in 
which a population conference is held governments raise their contributions and in the 
subsequent three years they decrease their contributions. The end result of this strategic 
behavior is that by shifting resources in time they ‘buy’ attention (Schindlmayer, 2001). The 
developing countries will, however, be on the losing side because it simply means that donors 
diminish their contributions in net terms. 
 
Explaining the Level of Disbursements 
The level of primary funds and the various subcategories are explained by a set of variables, 
as described above. Both the level of primary funds, split up by spending categories, and GDP 
are measured in constant US dollars (in 1995 prices). All the explanatory variables have been 
summed up above. The results of the estimation exercise are presented in Table 3.
10 
 
HERE TABLE 3 
 
One robust observation which can be derived from this table is the tight relationship between 
national income development and the generation of primary funds. The total income elasticity 
is 1.0 and for the underlying contribution categories it varies between 1.0 and 1.3. Essentially, 
this boils down to the message that “what’s good for the developed world, is good for the   17
developing world”. In general one can say that a 10 percent increase in real GDP leads to a 10 
percent increase in real primary funds. 
  The effect of unemployment is hardly traceable in the level of donor disbursements. 
The sign of parameters are in accordance with what one would expect: in hard times – when 
the level of unemployment increases - the level of primary funds decreases and the reverse 
applies to states of the economy where unemployment drops. The dummy variable expressing 
membership of the European Union does not affect on the aggregate level of funding. Only in 
the case of family planning can one trace some signs of substitution. The European Union 
spent, for example, in 2002 22 percent of its total primary funds on family planning projects 
whereas most EU members have percentages which fall far below this allocation percentage 
(only Germany exceeds the EU level with 38 percent spent on family planning). 
  Traces of political opportunism are hard to detect. The so-called ‘The Hague Forum’ 
(or ICPD+5) offers a possibility to test for the existence of political opportunism. 
Schindlmayer (2001) makes the claim that such opportunism is widespread in the years 
surrounding major population policy conferences. The results in Table 3 do not give an 
unambiguous verdict about the presence of political opportunism in offering population aid. 
We tested a number of dummy variables capturing the manner in opportunism could apply to 
funding behavior by varying the length of years in which funds are decreased after increasing 
in the year in which the population conference was held, when attention for the cause of the 
ICPD agenda is highest. For the discussion we will only focus on the robust outcomes and a 
robust finding is that at the aggregate level of primary funds there is no trace of opportunism 
to be found.  There is, however, some opportunism present in the funding of family planning 
and reproductive health. Considering the absence of an effect at the aggregate level, this type 
of opportunism could well be a consequence of shifting priorities decided at The Hague 
Forum. Of course, a firm test would have to include more population conferences to see if   18
there is truth to the claim of opportunism. The Hague Forum was organized as a kind of mid-
term review and with hindsight cannot be seen as a real agenda setting conference as it was in 
the past in Bucharest, Mexico City or Cairo. 
The responsiveness of donor governments to the conditions of recipient countries is 
approximated by the coefficients with respect to development status of the donor and the 
development gap with LDCs. In the theory of collective action the reason behind the 
formation of multilateral or international organizations is that there is a common threat 
(Sandler and Hartley, 2001). In the case of foreign aid this could well be the threat of 
unsustainable population growth, widespread poverty, or an epidemic. Testing this theory to 
the case of foreign population assistance is difficult because it entails capturing the threat in 
matters of population policy and collecting indicators in a consistent manner over time and 
across countries. In case of war, the threat is obvious, but in case of the ICPD agenda the 
threat is less clear. For the past population conferences the threat was clearly overpopulation 
or excessive population growth. However, with the Cairo conference human rights, especially 
those of women, became more prominent. Human welfare is assumed to be the central 
concept and we approximated this by using the Human Development Index of the WHO. To 
distinguish in a comparable manner the effect of human welfare on donating funds we used 
two variables: one representing the HDI of the donor country and the other representing the 
gap in human development between the donor country in question and the least developed 
countries. If the gap widens we would expect donor countries to be more responsive and 
increase the level of funding. 
To start with the concern with the fate of LDCs, the estimation results show that for 
population assistance in general the development gap is of no concern (see column 6). It is, 
however, clearly an issue in the case of unearmarked funds, family planning and basic 
research. The reasons behind these effects are difficult to trace and perhaps because the results   19
differ so widely across the subcategories one should not read too much in these results. The 
fact that unearmarked contributions are sensitive to human development gap can be ascribed 
to the fact that many small (European) countries contribute to multilateral organizations and 
that they are willing to support the developing countries more when things go bad, but who 
will decrease some of its funding when developing countries close the development gap. One 
should consider the magnitude of this effect in conjunction with the development of the donor 
countries. The magnitude of the coefficient may seem large, but this is more the consequence 
of the effect that increases in human development on the donor side are not very likely to 
show large or sudden fluctuations over time, whereas the increases in aid have been relatively 
large. From 1996 to 2002 the average HDI for all OECD/DAC combined increased from 92.3 
to 93.8. To be certain about the responsiveness of donor countries we tested whether the HDI 
of more specific regions are relevant in explaining donor funding. In most cases the results do 
not change. There is, however, one exception, viz. that donor countries are particularly 
sensitive to human development in Sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to donating funds for 
HIV/AIDS. This stands to reason since this particular region has the highest HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in the world and is also a focal point in HIV/AIDS campaigns. 
An alternative proxy for measuring the responsiveness of donor governments to the 
needs of developing countries is reflected in the level of official development assistance 
(excluding population assistance, as a percentage of GDP), and the level of income inequality 
in a donor country. The latter variable does not provide much explanatory power. Only in the 
case of the family planning can one detect a clear force that is in line with theoretical 
expectations: the more unequal the income distribution is in the donor country, the less such a 
country will give for aid projects, i.c. family planning.  
The government size is perhaps an imperfect proxy as a driving force for development 
aid, but it is nevertheless stressed by Addison et al. (2004) that a member’s ability to bear   20
financial responsibility for development aid commitments depends on the size of the public 
sector in that country. The relationship is straightforward: the capacity to fund development 
aid programs depends very much on the government’s ability to tax and the more a 
government can tax the easier it can finance aid programs. In Table 3 there is some evidence 
of the positive relationship between government size and population aid levels, but it is not 
robust across the different categories. The relationship is most clearly illustrated for the case 
of unearmarked contributions and HIV/AIDS projects. The unearmarked case is 
understandable as the funds which go the UN-organizations are dominated by Northern 
European countries, which have relatively large governments. These governments are also 
known for contributing a relatively large amount of money to ODA in general. The respective 
ODA-coefficients per contribution category give a clear idea how additional foreign aid 
resources are allocated. Increases in foreign aid resources are allocated to HIV/AIDS to be 
followed by unearmarked contributions. The absence of a relationship with family planning 
spending is quite striking as this used to be the focus of attention at many population 
conferences in the past. 
And this brings us to the last variable of interest: religion. As is known from research 
on private donations to churches and other charity goals (e.g. Regnerus et al. 1998, 
Iannaccone, 1998), differences between religions play a large role in the level of donations. 
Religion itself is a clear force in explaining the level of funds across countries. As one can see 
countries where the Catholicism belongs to one of the top two religions in a country exerts a 
clear negative force with respect to donations to multilateral organizations (as approximated 
by unearmarked funding in column 1) and family planning projects. If the Protestant or 
Lutheran religion belongs to one the dominant religions in the donor country this negative 
effect is counterbalanced or even overcompensated. However, we should be careful in putting 
too much weight on the religious factor and not confuse this element with a country   21
characteristic. It may well be the case that a binding factor in giving development aid plays a 
dominant role that coincides with the religious dummy variables. It is well-known that the 
Scandinavian countries fund a relatively high share of ODA or population assistance and 
these countries happen to be dominated by the Lutheran religion. 
 
Are Burdens Shared Equally? 
The previous model tried to mimic the behavior of a typical donor government in determining 
the level of aid. However, the question that concerns collective action is the question of 
sharing financial burdens. To explain burden sharing in development assistance we follow the 
approach of Addison et al. (2004) who examined burden sharing in the case of multilateral 
foreign aid and found some traces of  so-called ‘reverse exploitation’: the small countries 
support multilateral agencies disproportionately. The share of funds of a donor country in the 
total of funds is explained its ability to pay, as approximated by the share of GDP in the group 
of OECD/DAC countries. To control for other factors which impinge on donor behavior we 
have used a number of variables that also appear in Table 3. Table 4 presents the estimation 
results. Because most of the effects of the control variables are in line with those reported in 
Table 3 we will refrain from repeating ourselves. The parameter of central interest is, of 
course, the coefficient representing the effect of a change in income share to a change in the 
share of population assistance. 
 
HERE TABLE 4 
 
If each and every country carries the burden of financing a pure public good in line with its 
ability to pay, the burden sharing coefficient would be equal to one and if we assume that 
everyone has the same capabilities and preferences the effect of other variables would be   22
negligible. The ‘exploitation hypothesis’ would be a case where the burden sharing coefficient 
is larger than one, and ‘reverse exploitation’ would, of course, boil down to the case where the 
coefficient is smaller than one. The term ‘exploitation’ should however be carefully 
interpreted because there can only be exploitation in case a population assistance program is a 
pure global public good. In other words, if there are no individual-specific side benefits to the 
provision of foreign aid. In that respect, the term ‘exploitation’ is something of a misnomer 
because it does not necessarily signify exploitation of the big by the small countries. It could 
very well be the case that governments act in accordance with the principles of comparative 
advantage or economies of scale, or they derive benefits from ‘giving’ based on ideological 
preferences or religious principles. The ability to pay is the starting point for the estimation 
exercise, but given the fact that is difficult to really pin down the case of exploitation the 
focus in this section will be on shedding light on revealed burden sharing in terms of the 
ability to pay as well as other factors. 
The estimation results (in Table 4) show unambiguously that family planning, 
reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and basic research are programs for which large countries pay 
disproportionately.
11 The picture is reversed for unearmarked contributions. For this type of 
funds the small countries pay disproportionately more than their size would predict. The latter 
is in line with the findings of Addison et al. (2004). For the sharing of the burden of the ICPD 
agenda in general (see column 6), one can see that on an aggregate scale the burden sharing 
coefficient is virtually one. This finding is of some significance as it brings across that 
message that differences in funding are not so much the result of ability to pay, as 
approximated by the share of GDP within the group of OECD/DAC members, but far more 
the result of different (religious) preferences and different developments in income per capita 
and government size (see again column 6). Especially religion plays a large role in 
determining the burden share.   23
Conclusion and Discussion 
What drives the funding behavior of donor countries in light of the International Conference 
on Population and Development? Is it just a matter of ability to pay or is the willingness to 
pay of overriding importance? Although these questions may seem ‘academic’ to the policy 
advocates these questions go right to the heart of the entire enterprise of the ICPD. 
Understanding why differences in funding occur between donor countries may be the key to 
making the Cairo agenda a successful example of global collective action or at least 
understand why the financial ambitions of 1994 are out of reach (cf. Potts et al, 1999). In this 
study we present a first glance of the experience of population assistance developments over 
the years 1996-2002. Our analysis is certainly not the final verdict on motives and 
mechanisms driving donor funding. Given the fact that we have used data at a rather 
aggregated level, this type of analysis should be the starting point for digging deeper. 
The patterns in donor funding as revealed by our statistical analysis are bound to 
trigger a déjà vu amongst policy watchers of the past (Wolfson, 1983, and Salas, 1979). The 
Cairo conference and the Programme of Action were seen as “a turning point” but when it 
comes down to money, it appears that old habits do not die or at least are very slow in 
changing. The most dominant new trend is the rise of funding for HIV/AIDS and the 
concomitant fall in support for family planning. However, this trend is driven by the 
dominance exerted by the choices made by the United States. And this is again an old theme, 
together with the fact that promises have not been met and the fact that small countries are 
firmer supporters of multilateral organizations than larger countries that prefer bilateral aid 
channels. However, two additional factors deserve special mention because they exert such a 
strong influence on donor funding: the influence of religion in donor countries and the 
domestic interests vis-a-vis those of the recipient. To start with the latter, donor countries are 
willing to contribute to the ICPD agenda, but those contributions depend on the national   24
ability to pay and national interests and egalitarian or religious preferences and to a far lesser 
extent the situation which less developed countries face. The lack of attention to conditions of 
the recipient is not a unique characteristic of population assistance programs, it is central to 
most issues of development assistance and that of global health problems in particular. This 
simple insight helps to explain why funds fall short of the high ambitions of ICPD. In 1994 
the unmet needs of developing countries were taken as a point of departure, whereas actual 
funding decisions reveal that donor countries take their own ability to pay as a point of 
departure. In short, despite the ‘new’ rhetoric espoused at Cairo, donor behavior as revealed 
by their funding decisions does not seem to have changed substantially over time (cf. the 
overview provided by Schindlmayr, 2004). 
The second element often mentioned in discussing population assistance issues is the 
role of religion. The regression results show that it is a decisive factor in explaining cross-
country differences. Catholic countries are far more averse to family planning programs than, 
e.g., protestant countries. This should not surprise insiders because womens’ reproductive and 
sexual rights, the abortion issue and gender equality are all issues that sometimes clash with 
religious principles. The 1994 Cairo Conference was characterized by heated debates colored 
by the religious positions of the various advocates (anti-abortionists, anti-reproductive rights 
lobbies, etc.) In that respect the religious factor also helps to understand why family planning 
lost ground to the HIV/AIDS movement in getting acknowledged as one of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals. As one insider explains: the UN Secretariat “did not want to 
reopen ‘the mess’ of Cairo” (Crossette, 2005: 75). 
It is hard to derive firm policy lessons from these findings because some findings 
leave room for more than one interpretation. This is especially the case with the ‘division of 
aid’ that comes across in the statistics and estimation results: large countries concentrate on 
providing earmarked (bilateral) funds which deal with family planning, reproductive health,   25
HIV/AIDS and basic research. Smaller countries prefer to provide aid through unearmarked 
funds, which primarily flow to multilateral agencies like UNFPA and UNAIDS and 
international non-governmental organizations like IPPF. Although it is tempting to view these 
developments as corroboration of the fact that large countries free ride on the efforts of the 
small countries in case of multilateral aid and the reverse situation for bilateral aid this 
‘division of aid’ could very well be a reflection of the fact that donor countries concentrate on 
their comparative advantages in delivering aid. The specialization in giving aid or differences 
in preferences strikes us as a more logical explanation because the (reproductive) health care 
agenda comprises a host of different types of collective goods and each type of good calls for 
a different design of policy actions.
12 Multilateral agencies, that are the recipients of 
unearmarked funds, are expected to be involved in the provision of global public goods that 
generate more (non-excludable) benefits than the goods and services supported by earmarked 
bilateral funds. It is believed that the latter type of funds provides certain benefits, which flow 
to those who give the population assistance. The dominance of large countries should 
therefore not be denounced a priori because the element of scale plays a role in foreign aid 
provision and bilateral aid may well be a blessing in disguise as it brings about some form of 
centralization in foreign assistance that prevents collective action failures that are typical in 
managing aid flows. The need for collective action is also visible in so-called sectorwide 
approaches (SWAps) which offer an opportunity for more coordinated and multisectoral 
service-delivery approaches for sexual and reproductive health. SWAps involve a concerted 
effort of donors who pool their funds rather than support separate programs. However, as 
Mayhew (2002) notes, in practice the effectiveness of SWAps decreases when key donor 
organizations (such as USAID or UNFPA) remain outside a SWAp or when national policy 
makers don’t see the need for holistic planning that SWAps are designed to promote. It 
suggests how fickle the design and finance of an optimal reproductive health system is and   26
perhaps the main conclusion from statistics on the size and allocation of population assistance 
is that it very much reflects the fact that there apparently is no silver bullet solution to 
organizing and financing aid. As Kaul and Le Goulven (2003: 355) conclude in their review 
of international cooperation in financing global public goods: “Much of the financing of 
global public goods today is happenstance. Sometimes it works well, yet many other times it 
does not.” The present study has only scratched at the surface of aspects of the ICPD agenda 
and hopefully it sparks of further research in understanding the behaviour of donors and 
recipients. Only by this deeper understanding of the practice of collective action can one start 
designing better organizations and finance principles. 
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Figure 1: Gap between ambitions and actions in population assistance, 1996-2003 (in 































ICPD goal primary funds
 
 
* The ICPD goal differs from the fixed numbers mentioned in the program of action and is derived from the two 
foreign aid goals which countries try to live up to: 0.7% of GDP to ODA and 4% of ODA to population 
assistance, ergo: 0.028 percent of GDP. The year 2003 is a provisional figure and will not be included in the 
statistical analysis in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Source: UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI.   31
Figure 2: Average share of donor countries in primary funds and official development 
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* Social infrastructure and services = education, health, population, employment, housing; economic 
infrastructure and production sectors = transport, energy, banking, agriculture, industry, trade, tourism; multi-
sector = environment protection, women in development, urban and rural development; and other = commodity 
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Table 1: Total disbursement of 21 donor countries (in million current US dollars) 
 Unearmarked 
contributions 
Earmarked funds allocated to:  Total primary 
funds 
Primary funds 
as % ODA 









1996 648.5  305.0  241.0  104.7  56.0  1355.1  2.46 
1997 581.7  412.2  206.4  182.5  67.8  1450.5  3.00 
1998 438.0  454.6  237.6  237.1  92.1  1459.4  2.81 
1999 457.1  423.7  217.5  229.2  50.2  1377.7  2.45 
2000 537.7  386.0  237.2  353.0  55.0  1568.9  2.93 
2001 516.1  392.9  186.5  547.8  48.4  1691.6  3.24 
2002 580.6  396.5  294.7  769.9  71.6  2113.4  3.64 
Source: UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI 
   34
Table 2: Average shares of the burden of population activities across donor countries, 
1996-2002 

















  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Australia  0.7 1.1 3.5 4.2  6.0  1.9  1.7 
Austria  0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9 
Belgium  1.2 0.1 1.4 1.1  2.2  1.0  1.1 
Canada  2.5 1.0 2.7 4.6  5.2  2.5  2.8 
Denmark  9.5 0.1 0.7 0.5  0.2  3.5  0.7 
Finland  3.0 0.2 1.3 0.4  0.6  1.4  0.5 
France  2.3 0.0 0.3 2.6  3.8  1.3  6.1 
Germany  6.3 10.9 7.3  5.5  3.9 7.2  8.9 
Ireland  0.3 0.0 0.4 0.2  0.1  0.2  0.4 
Italy  0.9 0.1 0.8 1.2  0.5  0.8  5.0 
Japan 17.0  1.1  7.1  0.9  1.8  7.3  18.7
Luxembourg  0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7  0.0  0.3  0.1 
Netherlands  15.9 2.4 10.5 5.1  6.3 8.8  1.7 
New  Zealand  0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Norway  7.9 0.7 2.4 2.4  2.2  3.8  0.7 
Portugal  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.3  0.0  0.5 
Spain  0.1 0.5 2.0 0.2  0.1  0.5  2.6 
Sweden  6.4 0.2 7.6 3.1  3.3  4.1  1.1 
Switzerland  2.7 0.2 0.8 0.4  1.0  1.2  1.1 
UK  9.0  3.9 15.9 6.9  5.0 7.9  6.0 
USA  13.5 77.2 34.8 59.7  57.5  46.1  39.3
Source: UNFPA/UNAIDS/NIDI 
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HIV/AIDS Basic research  Sum of (1) to 
(5) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
GDP 1.01**  0.88**  1.23**  0.96**  1.14**  0.99** 
 (13.40)  (5.00)  (17.86)  (10.33)  (5.53)  (11.88) 
Unemployment -0.40*  -0.24  -0.14  0.45  -0.35 -0.27 
 (2.03)  (0.81)  (0.62)  (1.74) (0.82)  (1.56) 
Government size  2.68**  -2.46*  1.06  2.97**  1.54  1.27* 
 (3.60)  (2.00)  (1.38)  (3.26) (0.90)  (2.26) 
EU member  -0.37*  -0.88**  0.31  0.14  -0.40  -0.14 
 (2.01)  (2.79)  (1.31)  (0.59) (0.97)  (0.83) 
The Hague Forum  0.07*  0.23**  0.22**  0.17*  0.15  0.04 
 (2.01)  (2.69)  (4.07)  (2.38) (1.44)  (1.08) 
Development donor  14.45*  -6.67  15.67  46.82**  -20.23  15.96** 
 (1.96)  (0.51)  (1.68)  (5.38) (1.07)  (2.71) 
Development gap
b   3.47*  5.92*  2.52  -0.24  11.42**  1.77 
 (2.46)  (1.92)  (1.31)  (0.12) (3.55)  (1.38) 
ODA/GDP 0.38**  -0.33  0.37* 1.06**  0.56  0.32* 
 (2.60)  (1.04)  (2.35)  (4.71) (1.26)  (2.14) 
Income inequality  -0.97  -10.64**  0.22  1.76  -2.93  -0.17 
 (0.97)  (6.06)  (0.15)  (1.67) (1.33)  (0.18) 
Catholic -1.34**  -2.95**  -0.57  -0.35  1.23*  -0.86** 
 (5.55)  (5.38)  (1.55)  (1.20) (2.37)  (3.82) 
Lutheran 2.23**  -0.61  3.23**  1.91**  1.05  2.45** 
 (4.26)  (0.64)  (5.41)  (3.42) (1.26)  (6.69) 
Protestant 1.59**  3.52**  3.03**  2.65**  0.25  1.76** 
 (3.56)  (9.35)  (7.86)  (6.98)  (0.44)  (11.41) 
Constant -12.09*  25.34*  -20.36* -11.50  -15.68  -16.32* 
 (2.38)  (2.16)  (2.90)  (1.61) (1.33)  (3.05) 
N  =  135 109 133 123  103  140 
Pseudo R
2  0.82 0.57 0.56 0.57  0.40  0.85 
Loglikelihood LA  -51.8 -114.9  -129.0 -119.9 -142.6  -43.7 
Loglikelihood L0  -284.8 -268.3 -293.8 -281.4  -236.2  -292.4 
(a)  * Significance at 5% level, ** significance at 1% level. Absolute t-statistics are in brackets below the 
coefficients. In using Generalized Least Squares panel specific AR(1) processes were added to correct for 
autocorrelation in the time series, and estimates are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. To gauge the goodness 
of fit we present two loglikelihood values: LA for the full model and L0  for the model without any explanatory 
variables or correction for serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. 
(b) The development gap is defined as: HDI donor country i – HDI of LDC.   36
 














HIV/AIDS  Basic research  Sum  of (1) to 
(5) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Share GDP  0.94**  1.09**  1.23**  1.21**  1.35**  0.98** 
 (10.76)  (8.21)  (14.12)  (9.74)  (9.14)  (28.32) 
GDP per capita  1.25**  -0.59  -0.78  1.07*  -1.84**  0.95** 
 (2.96)  (1.10)  (1.45)  (2.09) (2.85)  (3.33) 
Unemployment -0.40*  -0.79**  -0.81**  0.71**  -0.40  -0.27 
 (2.30)  (2.54)  (2.68)  (2.60) (1.08)  (1.65) 
EU member  -0.60**  -0.94**  0.16  -0.67**  -0.28  -0.33* 
 (3.75)  (3.40)  (0.82)  (2.68) (1.13)  (2.10) 
ODA/GDP 0.43**  -0.84**  0.39  1.22**  0.75*  0.24 
 (2.84)  (2.83)  (1.94)  (4.63) (2.17)  (1.61) 
Government size  3.00**  -2.36*  -0.67  1.74  0.38  1.77** 
 (4.05)  (2.07)  (0.66)  (1.59) (0.26)  (3.08) 
Income  inequality  0.29  -12.04**  -2.68 -0.43 -3.03  -0.02 
 (0.22)  (7.08)  (1.52)  (0.28) (1.95)  (0.03) 
Catholic -1.16**  -2.52**  -0.45  0.07  1.06**  -0.74** 
 (4.51)  (4.18)  (1.04)  (0.20) (2.76)  (3.47) 
Lutheran 1.79**  0.21  3.48**  2.37**  1.54*  2.38** 
 (3.70)  (0.21)  (4.30)  (4.73) (2.14)  (7.38) 
Protestant 1.56**  3.48**  3.25**  2.74**  0.02  1.79** 
  (5.18)  (10.19)  (6.77) (8.38) (0.06)  (11.21) 
Constant -16.90  43.12**  23.47  -2.12  37.75**  -12.34 
 (1.71)  (3.33)  (1.79)  (0.20) (3.09)  (1.74) 
N =  135  109  133  124  103  140 
Pseudo R
2 0.79  0.54  0.52  0.52  0.40  0.85 
Loglikelihood LA -60.0  -123.7  -140.5 -135.7 -140.5  -43.7 
Loglikelihood L0 -284.6  -267.6  -292.8 -280.6 -233.7  -291.0 
(a) * Significance at 5% level, ** significance at 1% level. Absolute t-statistics are in brackets below the 
coefficients. In using Generalized Least Squares panel specific AR(1) processes were added to correct for 
autocorrelation, and estimates are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. To gauge the goodness of fit we present 
two loglikelihood values: LA for the full model and L0  for the model without any explanatory variables or 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                           
1 This clause was made explicit for donor countries in the Programme of Action (par. 14.11), and it was once 
explicated for developing countries in one of the preparatory committees, see: 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/newslett/94_13/2prepcom.html 
2 Previously published under the title Global Population Assistance Report published annually by UNFPA. 
3 In the statistical analysis we will exclude the new or emerging donor countries: Greece, Republic of Korea, 
Turkey and the new members of the European Union (like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Estonia) 
because of lack of substantial data and we exclude the European Union as a separate entity because we can not 
put it on the same footing as the behavior of individual donor countries. 
4 For a full description of the Programme of Action (UN-ICPD, 1995) and the so-called ‘costed population 
package’ see: http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/icpd_poa.htm. 
5 The donor data are checked to be consistent with the donor data collected by the OECD. 
6 For instance, the influential demography journal International Family Planning Perspectives receives funding 
from the U.S. Agency for International Development, and it is therefore prohibited under the Helms Amendment 
(P.L. 93-189) from publishing material that promotes abortion. 
7 At present it is too early to examine the consequences of the Mexico City Policy and we will refrain from doing 
so. 
8 The estimation model used is Generalized Least Squares with panel specific autoregressive processes of order 
1, AR(1) to correct for serial correlation in errors, and a correction for heteroskedasticity, i.e. differences in 
variance across panel members. The panel data are unbalanced in that not each and every country provided 
observations for each year. Specifically, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland have missing observations and 
therefore the total number of observations do not add up to 147 (21 countries for 7 years) and differ by funding 
category. 
9 We have considered alternative religious variables such as the leading religion in a country, the level of 
religious pluralism or the fact that a country has a state religion (see Barro and McCleary, 2004). The two most 
dominant religions of a country provided the best fit, although the conclusions do not differ substantially when 
alternative religious variables are used. The two most dominant religions in a country have been used as our 
preferred choice of religion variable. 
10 Because the United States exerts such a large influence on the ICPD agenda, we have re-estimated Table 3 by 
excluding the US. In general one can say that the parameter estimates are robust. The only exceptions to this 
observation applies the income elasticity (specifically for the spending categories reproductive health, 
HIV/AIDS and basic research) which becomes slightly smaller, the effect of ODA/GDP becomes considerably 
larger (for average primary funds the coefficient changes from 0.3 to 0.6) and the effect of the catholic religion 
on donor funding becomes considerably larger: especially funds on family planning and reproductive health are 
significantly affected in a negative manner. 
11 Note that running a robustness test by excluding the US from the sample of donors would not make sense, 
because the essence of the exploitation hypothesis is the fact that there are large and small countries and this 
counterfactual exercise would ignore the fact that the dominant position of the US on the ICPD agenda is a fact 
of life. 
12 A typical problem in the case of global health care is that the health problems of the developed world differ 
quite distinctly from those of the developing world. Priorities in investing in new medicines, vaccines and 
treatments are bound to be affected by this divergence of interests. It is what is typically called the ‘90/10 gap’ 
by the WHO (2002: 23): less that 10 percent of the US annual spending on health-related research and 
development, addresses the health concerns of 90 percent of the global population. Citizens of the developed 
world primarily suffer from non-communicable diseases, whereas citizens in LDCs suffer from infectious and 
parasitic diseases (Kremer, 2002). It goes without saying that infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS or Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases (STDs) call for a different approach than non-infectious diseases (Sandler and Arce, 2002). 